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We use a panel of more than 100 countries for the period 1980 to 2002 to analyse the 
relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and wage inequality.  We 
particularly check whether this relationship is non-linear, in line with a theoretical 
discussion.  We find that the effect of FDI differs according to the level of development: we 
depict two different patterns, one for OECD (developed) and one for non-OECD 
(developing) countries.  Results suggest the presence of a non linear effect in developing 
countries; wage inequality increases with FDI inward stock but this effect diminishes with 
further increases in FDI.  For developed countries, wage inequality decreases with FDI 
inward stock and there is no robust evidence to show that this effect is non-linear.   
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F114/BF). 1. Introduction 
When investigating the impact of the increasing importance of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for host countries, most research concerns itself with effects on efficiency 
or, more specifically, productivity and economic growth at either the macro or the micro 
level.
1  While it is generally found that FDI can have positive growth and, hence, efficiency 
effects, what is generally neglected is the issue of equality.  However, not least the 
publication of books such as Naomi Klein’s (2000) No logo or Stiglitz’s (2002) 
Globalization and its discontents has brought this issue back to the forefront of public and 
policy attention.  While FDI may bring benefits to the economy in which they locate, it is 
by no means clear whether everyone will benefit to the same extent or indeed whether some 
will be better off while others will suffer from this.   
This paper attempts to tackle this issue by providing a comprehensive analysis of 
the effect of FDI on inequality in the receiving country.  Inequality in this paper is 
understood as wage inequality.  In other words, we attempt to investigate whether FDI 
benefits everyone in the same way in terms of wages – hence, being neutral with respect to 
inequality, or whether it helps to alleviate, or actually worsens, inequality in wages.   
The increase in income and wage inequality in many countries has been much 
discussed in the recent economic literature. There is supporting evidence, for both 
industrialised and developing countries, for the increase in inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers, as well as for skill premia for workers with higher education.
2  Wage is 
the main source of personal income for the great majority of people and its distribution has 
therefore important implications for income inequality.  Two main explanations have been 
                                                 
1 Borensztein et al. (1998) and Alfaro et al. (2004) are recent examples of the former, Javorcik (2004) and 
Kugler (2005) of the latter type of research.   
2 Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Acemoglu (2003a) discuss the empirical evidence on the widening 
inequality in wages. 
  1advanced in the literature for this phenomenon: trade and technological change.
3  Both of 
these explanations have received much attention, and the evidence is summarised 
competently by Chennels and van Reenen (1999), Krugman (2000) and Feenstra and 
Hanson (2001).
4  
Compared to that literature, relatively few papers have instead dealt empirically 
with the role played by multinational companies and, more generally, FDI for inequality in 
the host country.
5  Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Figini and Görg (1999) and Taylor and 
Driffield (2005) use industry level data for Mexico, Ireland and the UK, respectively, and 
find that there is a link between relative wages and FDI.
6  The latter two papers also find 
that this effect is non-linear – inward FDI increases wage inequality but at a decreasing rate 
over time.  However, in a similar study for the US, Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) fail to 
find any significant effects of FDI on wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers.   
In a cross-country framework, Tsai (1995) studies the link between FDI and 
inequality using a sample of 33 developing countries and finds that FDI increased 
inequality only in some Asian countries.  Gopinath and Chen (2003) find, with a sample of 
11 developing countries, that FDI flows widen the skilled – unskilled wage gap (measured 
as the share of unskilled labour in GNP) for a subset of developing countries although they 
                                                 
3 A third explanation recently considered in the theoretical literature is based on the reorganisation and 
decentralisation of decisions in firms. These processes bear particular implications for wage formation: by 
giving employers and employees more incentives to choose decentralised bargaining, wage dispersion is 
expected to increase. See Lindbeck and Snower (1996) and, for a review, Aghion et al. (1999). Antras et al. 
(2006) present an interesting theoretical model linking the organisation of work and the structure of wages, 
which can be applied to a North-South model. Their results highlight that outsourcing always increases wage 
inequality in the South.   
4 Many papers also link trade liberalisation with skill-biased technological progress in models of endogenous 
innovation (Acemoglu, 2003b; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999; Neary, 2002). For an empirical test on 
Mexico, see Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003). 
5 There are also a number of recent theoretical contributions, see, e.g., Liang and Mai (2003), Marjit et al. 
(2004) and Das (2005).  For a general discussion of globalisation, FDI and inequality, see Lee and Vivarelli 
(2006). 
6 Girma and Görg (2006) also find that foreign owned multinationals in the UK pay higher wages than 
comparable domestic firms, and that the magnitude of these wage premia differ between skilled and unskilled 
workers, hence impacting on wage inequality.   
  2appear to lead to cross-country convergence of wages.  Basu and Guariglia (2006) use a 
panel of around 80 countries to test a theoretical model linking FDI to growth and 
inequality in human capital and conclude that inward FDI promotes economic inequality. 
This paper addresses the question as to whether foreign direct investment has an 
effect on domestic wage inequality, by using a large panel of countries for a recent period 
(1980 – 2002).  Our empirical approach is inspired by a theoretical framework due to 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) where wage inequality is examined in a model of a general 
purpose technology (GPT).  The theoretical considerations lead us to expect a non-linear 
effect of FDI on inequality, and we test for this explicitly in our analysis.  As far as we are 
aware, our study is the first to do so in a cross-country context, and our results show that 
the non-linearity is borne out by the data.  A further novel feature of our paper is that we 
exploit our large cross-country dimension by allowing for different effects of FDI on 
inequality for industrialised (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries.  Again, doing 
so brings to the fore important differences between these two country groupings.   
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature by building our own database on wage 
inequality indices, using data from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database, which allows 
us to include a large number of countries over a fairly long time period.  These data also 
allow us capture the overall effect of FDI by means of inequality indices built on the whole 
distribution of wages in the manufacturing sector.  Since the theory predicts changes in 
both wage levels and the number of workers in the two groups, our approach seems more 
promising in capturing this complex pattern than the simple ratio of skilled and unskilled 
wages used in many other papers. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the 
theoretical background which motivates our empirical analysis. Section 3 introduces the 
  3methodology and describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results while Section 5 
summarises our findings and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
The theoretical framework, which we use to motivate our subsequent empirical 
analysis is based on the endogenous growth model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1998: 
Chapter 8).  They discuss the effect of social learning on economic growth, and the effects 
of differences in workers’ skill levels on aggregate output and wages in the economy.   










= ∫ di x A Y i i , 0 ≤≤ 1 α      ( 1 )  
where aggregate output Y is produced using intermediate inputs x in each sector i.  
Intermediate inputs x are produced using labour as the only factor of production.  The 
production technology is represented by the technology parameter A, where A = 1 if the old 
technology is used, and  1 > A  if the new technology is used, i.e., the technology parameter 
A is raised by a constant factor γ in the case of new technology.  In the status quo, the 
economy only uses the old technology, and new technologies are introduced through 
innovation on a general purpose technology (GPT). It is likely that the probability of 
success in finding a template with the new GPT depends on the ratio of skilled workers 
(who experiment with the new technology in the innovation sector) to unskilled workers 
(who are assumed to produce by using the old technology). 
This pattern leads to two stages of development and inequality. Firms in stage 1 
need a fraction of skilled labour to carry out the research necessary for the discovery of the 
template of the new GPT and for experimenting with the new technology, as they are 
unfamiliar with it.  While doing so they still produce output using the old technology. The 
  4amount of investment in innovation is however too small to absorb the supply of skilled 
labour-force, which is mainly employed in the old technology-sector. Demand for skilled 
labour is low, and skilled and unskilled labour is paid the same wage: therefore wage 
inequality is low. 
In stage 2, firms successfully implementing the new technology require only skilled 
labour to produce with it.  By the end of the adjustment process, all firms have made the 
jump into stage 2 and use the new technology for production purposes.
7  In the transition 
period, demand for skilled labour steeply increases, thus leading to labour-market 
segmentation in which skilled labour is paid a higher wage, and wage inequality (i.e., a 
function of the ratio between skilled and unskilled wages) increases. 
The evolution of wages is shown in Figure 1, adapted from Aghion et al. (2002).  
As can be seen, there is a point in time (A) at which, due to the increased demand for skilled 
labour, the labour market becomes segmented; the wage for skilled workers increases and 
the wage for unskilled workers falls towards zero.   
 








                                                 
7 The speed of adjustment depends, among other factors, upon the probability that a firm learns through 
imitation, the probability that a firm makse a discovery of a template on its own and the share of R&D in the 
economy. 
  5Arguably, the described adjustment process leads to an inverted-U shape of wage 
inequality with respect to the introduction of a GPT.  In the early stages wage inequality 
increases because firms innovate using skilled labour, increasing the demand for and, thus, 
raising the wage of skilled labour.  The higher the innovative output, the faster the speed of 
adjustment.  At the end of the adjustment period, wage inequality decreases since all firms 
move into stages 1 and 2 and demand for unskilled labour falls towards zero.  Eventually, 
only skilled labour will be employed when all firms are in stage 2.
8
This model is relevant to the question to be studied in this paper if we re-interpret it 
in terms of the effect of foreign direct investment on the availability of new technologies in 
the economy.  Specifically, we view foreign direct investment as a vehicle for introducing 
new technologies in the host country and as providing “role models” for indigenous firms.
9  
This gives rise to a two-step process in which first, the multinational introduces new 
technology into the country, therefore increasing inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers.  In the second step, as more FDI flows into the economy, domestic firms follow 
up, by imitating the more advanced production technologies used in multinationals.
10  This, 
hence reduces the gap yielding an inverted-U pattern for the relationship between FDI and 
wage inequality.   
Some evidence in line with such an inverted U-shape relationship has been found by 
Figini and Görg (1999) for Ireland.  We expand on their paper in the following analysis, 
using a large panel of developed and developing countries, hence, providing more general 
evidence.   
 
                                                 
8 One should add that the overlapping of new and different GPT might depict a situation in which economies 
are always in a phase of transition; the overall effect on wage inequality, therefore, would depend on the 
relative speed of technological innovation with respect to education upgrade.  
9 In this respect, FDI can be seen as a substitute for local R&D, consistent with Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 
(1999). 
  63. Methodology and data 
We use the theoretical discussion in Section 2 as a motivation for our empirical 
analysis where we focus on examining the effect of FDI on wage inequality and, 
specifically, on attempting to identify whether there is indeed an inverted U-shape 
relationship.  Accordingly, the basic specification of our empirical estimation equation is 
 
INEQit = b0 + b1FDI + b2FDI
2 + b3X + ui + λt+ eit     (2) 
 
where INEQ is a measure of wage inequality in country i at time t, FDI measures 
inward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP in the country, X is a vector of 
control variables also assumed to be correlated with inequality, u is a country specific 
effect, λ a full set of time dummies and e is the remaining white noise error term.  We deal 
with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity across countries by employing a fixed effect 
(within transformation) estimator which purges the country-specific effect.  The quadratic 
term for FDI is included in order to allow for the non-linearity suggested by the theoretical 
framework.  The model is estimated using an unbalanced panel of 103 countries with yearly 
data over a more than twenty-year period, 1980 – 2002. 
We measure wage inequality (INEQ) by computing both Gini and Theil indices for 
each country-year.  We do both in order to check how robust our results are to the precise 
measure used.  Inequality indices are calculated on the average wages per employee across 
three digit ISIC manufacturing industries in country i at time t, weighted by the number of 
employees in each sector.  Data on sectoral average wages are obtained from the UNIDO 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 There is supporting evidence that such involuntary knowledge transfer does indeed take place, for example, 
through the movement of workers from multinationals to domestic firms.  See, for example, Görg and Strobl 
(2005) for evidence for Ghana.   
  7Industrial Statistics database.  These data show substantial variation in wages across 
countries and sectors.
11
We decided to measure wage inequality in terms of general wage inequality 
between sectors and between workers rather than in terms of the gap between wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers, for a number of reasons.  First, the theoretical discussion in 
Section 2 implies that innovation affects both the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers and the relative and absolute level of employment of the two groups of workers; by 
measuring inequality only with a relative wage gap, the second effect would be lost.   
Second, it can been argued that the complex pattern of interactions between FDI, 
innovation and labour structure of the firm is hardly caught by the simple wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers: innovations spread their effect on the productivity 
of all workers, thereby affecting the whole distribution of wages.  Third, one important 
feature is that inequality also increases within both skilled and unskilled groups, for 
example due to the enhancement of individual abilities and decentralised bargaining 
(Rubinstein and Tsiddon, 2004).  The average wage for each skill group, therefore, does not 
appropriately capture such dynamics.  Fourth, when we apply the GPT model to FDI, it is 
plausible that multinationals focus their investment not equally across the whole 
manufacturing sector but primarily in some specific sectors in which the host country has 
relative advantages. Therefore, if FDI transfers technology, the effect on productivity and 
wages could be different according to the relative importance of FDI across sectors, and 
would be better caught by measures of wage inequality between rather than within sectors.  
Finally, apart from these conceptual reasons our choice is also driven by data availability. 
                                                 
11 In order to mitigate the distorting impact of measurement error and outliers we keep the more plausible 
data, i.e., we drop observations where the industry average wage exceeds $100,000, or where total 
employment is less than 50 employees, or where annual wage growth is less than –50% or higher than 50%. 
  8Disaggregated data on wages by skill groups are available for very few countries, and are 
not necessarily comparable among them.
12
In the econometric estimation we are mainly concerned with identifying the effect 
of inward FDI on wage inequality.
13 As a proxy, we use FDI inward stocks as a percentage 
of GDP. Data on FDI are obtained from the UN World Investment Report. This data source 
provides information on total inward investment, measured in both flows and stocks. We 
use data on FDI stocks rather than flows because our assumption is that FDI contributes to 
the stock of general-purpose technology available in the economy.  We allow for a non-
linear relationship between FDI and inequality, by introducing also the squared term of FDI 
into equation (2). 
According to the literature on wage inequality, we introduce three basic control 
variables in equation (2), namely openness to trade, level of development and level of 
education. With respect to trade openness, the basic H-O theorem suggests that with 
increased trade, wage inequality in countries relatively abundant with unskilled labour 
should decrease, while it should increase in countries relatively abundant with skilled 
labour. The more open a country is to international trade, the more evident would be the 
effect on wage inequality. Trade openness is defined and measured as total imports plus 
total exports over GDP.  This measure is similar to the one used by Francois and Nelson 
(2003) and allows us to control for the effect of increased trade volumes on wage 
inequality.  Data for this variable come from the World Development Indicators available 
from the World Bank.   
Second, we introduce the level of development as a control as wage inequality 
depends on the economic structure of the country, which is linked to the level of 
                                                 
12 On data issues and comparability, see Freeman and Oostendorp (2000); Forbes (2001). 
13 It can be argued, however, that also outward FDI has an effect, since they are related with technology 
transfers abroad; therefore they should bring, in the host country, the opposite effect of inward FDI.   
Developing this argument and testing for it empirically is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  9development. We include GDP per capita in the empirical model in order to make sure that 
inward FDI does not merely pick up the impact of the level of economic development on 
inequality.  Data for the construction of this variable come from the World Development 
Indicators.   
Finally, the level of education mainly attempts to control for the supply side of the 
labour market, which should counteract the effects of FDI and trade, coherent with the 
theoretical model in section 2. Clearly, the higher is wage inequality, the higher the skill 
premium for workers and the higher the pressure on education to produce more skilled 
workers.  As discussed in the introduction, effects on wage inequality happen because there 
is no one to one change in demand and supply of skilled labour. The level of education in 
the country is computed as the total number of students enrolled in secondary education as 
a percentage of the total population.  We would expect that, the higher the enrolment ratio, 
the higher the supply of skilled labour.  This, in turn, should reduce wage inequality by 
increasing the relative supply of skilled labour.  Data to construct this variable come from 
the World Development Indicators. 
Arugably, the model could also include other factors likely to affect inequality.  For 
example, according to Acemoglu (2003a), institutions matter, as a more stringent 
legislation on minimum wage and on workers rights can affect the overall level of 
inequality.  However, reliable measures of labour legislation are difficult to come by.  In 
some specifications of the model we tried to proxy labour legislation with the component of 
the Economic Freedom Index related to the labour market; however, results are 
disappointing due to the poor coverage of data.  Arguably, the country fixed effects 
included in equation (2) capture at least the time invariant components of such institutions, 
which go a long way in such a large panel as ours with very heterogeneous countries.  
Some papers also try to measure the effect of relative price changes (Beyer et al., 1999) on 
  10wage inequality. We do not take this into account mainly for two reasons.  Firstly, we do 
not have detailed price data available and, secondly, these effects should at least be partially 
captured by both trade and FDI variables. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used are presented in Table 1, while the 
list of countries in the database, together with the average value of the Gini index of wage 
inequality over the period under investigation, is in Table 2. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
4. Estimation results 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (2) in its basic form.  Columns 
(1) and (2) show results for regressions respectively including the simple FDI term, and the 
quadratic specification, with the Gini coefficient as dependant variable.  It is notable that 
none of the coefficients on the FDI variables are statistically significant in these 
estimations.  This is also the case in columns (3) and (4) where the Theil coefficient, as an 
alternative measure of inequality, is the dependent variable.  These unsatisfactory results 
may be due to pooling data for countries that are at different levels of development 
(Blonigen and Wang, 2005).  Arguably, developed countries may react differently to an 
inflow of new technology from foreign direct investment than developing countries, which 
are at a lower level of technological development.  Specifically, the theoretical arguments 
discussed in Section 2 may particularly apply to developing countries rather than developed 
economies, as the latter are already at relatively high levels of technological sophistication. 
We therefore split our sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, assuming that 
the latter forms the group of developing countries, and separately estimate equation (2). 
Estimates support the assumption of inappropriate pooling and show different evidence for 
the two groups of countries.  From column (2) of Table 4 we find that there is evidence of a 
  11concave relationship between FDI and inequality for developing countries, in line with the 
theoretical discussion.  The comparison between columns (1) and (2) allows us to underline 
that the inclusion of the quadratic term is necessary, thus showing that the link between FDI 
and wage inequality is indeed non linear.  For developed countries, we find in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 5 that inward FDI has a different impact on domestic wage inequality.  
There is evidence of a different quadratic relationship between FDI and inequality: 
inequality seems to be negatively linked to FDI, but this effect diminishes as the FDI 
inward stock increases.  In line with our theoretical framework, this may suggest that 
developed countries are already at high levels of technological development and use mature 
technology.  Further inflow of technology through FDI implies that technologies become 
more widespread and easier to use, so that more workers are able to reap the benefits in 
terms of increased wage premium.   
A further interesting difference between OECD and non-OECD countries stems 
from the coefficients of the three other covariates.  Increases in GDP per capita are 
associated with reductions in wage inequality for developing countries, but for developed 
countries we find an insignificant, although positive, relationship.  The trade coefficient is 
not statistically significant in any of the regressions.  Furthermore, the impact of education 
also seems to differ across the two groups of countries; whereas the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant for OECD countries, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between level of education and wage inequality in developing countries.
14   
As a first robustness check we replicate the estimates of equation (2) by using the 
Theil index of inequality rather than the more commonly used Gini index.  The results of 
these estimations, using the same covariates, are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 
(for non OECD countries) and columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 (for OECD countries).   
                                                 
14 However, there might be an endogeneity problem, since education can be enhanced by the increase in wage 
inequality following the influx of multinational firms. 
  12Overall, the coefficients look very similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance 
to the results based on the Gini index.  However, the only difference relates to the 
coefficient of education for non-OECD countries, which is no longer statistically significant 
when using the Theil index of wage inequality (Table 4, columns 3 and 4).  
The results so far suggest that the link between inward FDI and wage inequality 
depends on the level of economic (and presumably technological) development in the host 
country.  In order to investigate this complex link further, and to investigate the role played 
by education, we generate interaction terms of the FDI variables with education and include 
them in the estimation equation.  The results are reported in Table 6, columns (1) and (2) 
for OECD countries and columns (3) and (4) for non-OECD countries.  Such a 
specification improves the estimates for OECD countries only; the F-test reported at the 
bottom of Table 6 indicates that interaction terms are appropriate for OECD countries but 
not for non OECD countries, underlying once again that the structure is different for the 
two groups of countries.  For non OECD countries we reject this specification and prefer 
the one without interaction terms, stated in equation (2) and estimated in Table 4. 
One possible objection to this specification is the lack of any lag structure in the 
model.  It is hardly conceivable that FDI has an immediate effect on wages in the host 
countries.  In Table 7 we attempt to deal with this issue by imposing a lag structure of one 
period to FDI variables.  Such a specification suits very well the sample of non OECD 
countries (columns (3) and (4)), by improving the significance of the estimates.  However, 
the squared term of FDI in columns (1) and (2) relating to OECD countries is now no 
longer statistically significant. 
The regressions thus far assume that FDI is strictly exogenous to inequality.  This 
may be a strong assumption, if FDI were correlated with other observables or 
unobservables that affect inequality and that are not controlled for in the estimation, or if 
  13FDI is a function of inequality rather than a determinant of it.  Under the assumption that 
the correlation of FDI with the error term is fixed over time controlling for country fixed 
effects, as done in our estimations thus far, alleviates this problem.  However, in order to 
take account of potential endogeneity more formally we resort to using the now popular 
GMM systems estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  Accordingly, one 
simultaneously estimates first differenced and level versions of the equation, where for the 
former appropriately lagged values and for the latter appropriately lagged differences of the 
endogenous variables can serve as valid instruments.  The validity of these instruments can 
be tested using a Sargan-type test.
15   
We employ this estimator to our regression.  In order to avoid problems of relatively 
small sample size in the application of the GMM systems estimator we revert to pooling the 
data and including interaction terms of the FDI variables with a dummy variable for OECD 
countries.  Results are reported in Table 8.  The Hansen J-statistic supports the use of 
instruments.  Estimates of the coefficients are in line with our previous results.  For non-
OECD countries we find that inward FDI has a positive effect on inequality and that this 
relationship is non-linear, in line with the theoretical expectation.  For OECD countries, the 
interaction term indicates that the effect of FDI is negative, as found in the previous 
estimations.  The interaction term on the FDI squared variable is not statistically 
significant, indicating that there is no non-linearity for the effect of FDI in OECD countries, 
in line with our findings in Table 7.
16
                                                 
15 As instruments for the lagged FDI variables we use all values from t-3 onwards.   
16 To conclude the sensitivity check, we try the Gini coefficient of income, rather than wage, inequality as 
dependant variable. In such specification, the link between inequality and FDI disappears.  This is not 
surprising for two reasons.  Firstly, the sample size is reduced immensely due to unavailability of data.  
Secondly, although it has been asserted that there is a strict relationship between wage and income inequality 
(Galbraith and Kum, 2005), data on income inequality are more scattered, less reliable and less theoretically 
linked to FDI to provide any robust test of model (2). We also attempt to control for institutional matters, 
measuring the “degree of liberalisation” in the labour market by means of the fifth component of the 
Economic Freedom Index. We expect that a more “institutionally constrained” economy, due to collective 
bargaining and minimum wage legislation, has a lower wage inequality. However, the inclusion of this index 
in the model reduces the size of the sample too much, and results are not reliable. 
  14 
5. Conclusion 
We use a panel of more than 100 developing and developed countries for the period 
1980 to 2002 to analyse the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
wage inequality.  We particularly check whether this relationship is non-linear, in line with 
a theoretical discussion based on Aghion and Howitt’s (1998) model of GPT, and whether 
there are differences between developed and developing countries.  We measure total wage 
inequality in the manufacturing sector by means of Gini and Theil inequality indices, while 
FDI is measured through the total stock of foreign investment accumulated into the host 
country. We find that the effect of FDI differs according to the level of development by 
showing two different patterns, one for OECD (developed) countries and one for non-
OECD (developing countries).  Results for developing countries suggest the presence of a 
non linear effect; wage inequality increases with FDI inward stock but this effect 
diminishes with further increases in FDI.  For developed countries, wage inequality 
decreases with FDI inward stock and there is no robust evidence to show that this effect is 
non-linear.   
These results might lead to some tentative policy considerations.  Our findings 
suggest that disentangling the different dimensions of globalisation and their social effects 
is important.  It is likely that globalisation affects differently the wage distribution in 
countries according to their stage of development and to the education level of its 
workforce.  Negative social effects are more likely to be linked to financial rather than 
commercial integration, and FDI inflows seem to be associated with more domestic wage 
inequality, although this effect decreases over time.  These results are consistent with 
Santarelli and Figini (2004) on the effects of globalisation on poverty and stimulates the 
policy debate. While on one hand there is evidence that FDI increases wages in host 
  15countries and, hence, people may be better off in absolute terms (e.g., Lipsey and Sjöholm, 
2001; Girma and Görg, 2006), the “happiness” literature states that people care about 
relative incomes (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996), so an increase in inequality stemming 
from FDI is perceived negatively.  Equity considerations do not have to be underestimated 
by economists and policy makers when evaluating globalisation processes. 
Our approach produces some interesting results but also opens the door for further 
research, mainly in two directions.  First, at the theoretical level, more effort has to be put 
into the investigation of FDI as a channel for technology transfer, and hence, as a 
globalisation factor impacting on inequality.  Second, at the empirical level, more care has 
to be dedicated to wage inequality measurement, not only in terms of total distribution of 
wages across sectors, but also in terms of the skilled to unskilled wage ratio. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of the variables used 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Gini 606 15.78  6.91 
Theil 606  5.60 5.54 
FDI 606  17.29  26.95 
GDP per 
capita 
606 9888.9  10981.14 
Education 606  7.76  3.13 
Trade 606 68.77 36.21 
 
  20Table 2 – Gini index of inequality for the countries included in the database 
 
1. Albania  7.36 
2. Argentina  17.18 
3. Australia  8.75 
4. Austria  11.55 
5. Bahrain  47.94 
6. Bangladesh  13.34 
7. Belgium  22.22 
8. Bolivia  21.78 
9. Brazil  23.91 
10. Bulgaria  19.00 
11. Burundi  26.12 
12. Cameroon  34.12 
13. Canada  11.58 
14. Central African Rep.  20.16 
15. Chile  20.37 
16. China  4.98 
17. China, Hong Kong  8.58 
18. China, Macao  2.80 
19. Colombia  16.21 
20. Congo  27.01 
21. Costa  13.85 
22. Croatia  9.51 
23. Cyprus  13.09 
24. Czech Republic  8.53 
25. Denmark  6.48 
26. Ecuador  19.66 
27. Egypt  17.22 
28. El Salvador  20.74 
29. Ethiopia  12.81 
30. Fiji  21.89 
31. Finland  8.01 
32. France  9.30 
33. Gabon  26.28 
34. Germany  8.41 
35. Ghana  23.56 
36. Greece  15.87 
37. Guatemala  28.89 
38. Haiti  17.58 
39. Honduras  23.13 
40. Hungary  13.15 
41. Iceland  9.00 
42. India  22.31 
43. Indonesia  17.81 
44. Iran  9.91 
45. Ireland  13.73 
46. Israel  21.09 
47. Italy  10.24 
48. Jamaica  37.15 
49. Japan  15.20 
50. Jordan  18.84 
51. Kenya  19.28 
52. Korea, Republic of  11.11 
53. Kuwait  36.38 
54. Latvia  8.80 
55. Lithuania  17.75 
56. Malawi  25.55 
57. Malta  8.45 
58. Mauritius  16.66 
59. Mexico  14.53 
60. Mongolia  29.77 
61. Morocco  21.68 
62. Mozambique  22.66 
63. Namibia  11.42 
64. Nepal  17.37 
65. Netherlands  7.31 
66. New Zealand  11.96 
67. Nicaragua  12.90 
68. Nigeria  15.18 
69. Norway  7.89 
70. Oman  22.60 
71. Pakistan  19.40 
72. Panama  17.27 
73. Peru  23.34 
74. Philippines  19.27 
75. Poland  11.52 
76. Portugal  17.78 
77. Rep. of Moldova  22.50 
78. Romania  8.40 
79. Russian Federation  16.39 
80. Senegal  15.97 
81. Serbia and 
Montenegro 
28.26 
82. Slovakia  10.30 
83. Slovenia  10.91 
84. South Africa  20.51 
85. Spain  13.94 
86. Sri Lanka  14.60 
87. Suriname  13.35 
88. Sweden  4.41 
89. TFYR of Macedonia  16.99 
90. Thailand  17.45 
91. Trinidad & Tobago  27.30 
92. Tunisia  28.55 
93. Turkey  18.99 
94. Ukraine  16.20 
95. United Arab Emir.  18.08 
96. United Kingdom  10.19 
97. United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
14.62 
98. United States of 
America 
13.02 
99. Uruguay  16.99 
100. Venezuela  18.34 
101. Viet Nam  13.47 
102. Zambia  21.87 
103. Zimbabwe  17.75 
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Table 3 – Fixed effect regressions, pooled sample 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
 (1  -  Gini) 
 
(2 - Gini)  (3 - Theil)  (4 - Theil) 














































Observations 664 664 664 664 
Countries  107 107 107 107 
R-squared  0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 4 -  Fixed effect regressions, Non OECD countries 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
 (1  -  Gini) 
 
(2 - Gini)  (3 - Theil)  (4 - Theil) 














































Observations 397 397 397 397 
Countries  81 81 81 81 
R-squared  0.11 0.14 0.09 0.10 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
regressions include a full set of time dummies 
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Table 5 -  Fixed effect regressions, OECD countries 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
 (1  -  Gini) 
 
(2 - Gini)  (3 - Theil)  (4 - Theil) 














































Observations 200 200 200 200 
Countries  22 22 22 22 
R-squared  0.10 0.12 0.08 0.10 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 6 - Fixed effect regressions, education interaction terms 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
  (1 – Gini, OECD 
countries) 
(2 – Theil, OECD 
countries) 
(3 – Gini, non 
OECD countries) 
(4 – Theil, non 
OECD countries) 




























Inward FDI stock 









































Observations 200 200 397 397 
Countries 22  22  81  81 
F test (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.79  0.85 
R-squared 0.17  0.16  0.14  0.10 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
F test for joint significance of interaction terms 
regressions include a full set of time dummies 
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Table 7- Fixed effect regressions, lagged FDI 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
  (1 – Gini, OECD 
countries) 
(2 – Theil, 
OECD countries) 
(3 – Gini, non 
OECD countries) 
(4 – Theil, non 
OECD countries) 




















































Observations 200  200  377 377 
Countries 22  22  77  77 
R-squared 0.10  0.08  0.15  0.13 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 8 - GMM regressions 
(dependent variable is Gini or Theil coefficient) 
 
  (1 – Gini) 
 
(2 – Theil) 
 
Inward FDI stock lagged  0.102  0.064 
 [1.93]*  [1.67]* 
Inward FDI stock squared lagged  -0.0002  -0.0001 
 [-2.24]**  [-1.84]* 
Inward FDI stock lagged * OECD  -0.189  -0.097 
 [-2.12]**  [-1.71]* 
Inward FDI stock squared lagged * OECD  0.001  0.0004 
 [1.49]  [1.03] 
GDP per capita  -0.950  -0.539 
 [-2.04]**  [-1.58] 
Education -0.169  -0.122 
 [-0.91]  [-0.55] 
Trade 5.483  8.336 
 [0.69]  [1.84]* 
Hansen J statistic (p-value)  1.00  1.00 
Observations 554  554 
Countries 96  96 
 
Constant and full set of time dummies included 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
regressions include a full set of time dummies 
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